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ABSTRACT 
Immigrant parents are currently burdened with unique risks to their parental rights, 
risks that bear little relation to their ability to care for their children. Recent 
developments in family and immigration law, historical cultural prejudices against 
non-Western parenting traditions, and poor immigrants’ limited access to the U.S. 
legal system are largely to blame. 
This Note explores the inadequacies in our legal system contributing to the struggles 
of immigrant parents to maintain family unity and connects the current situation to 
the disproportionate number of terminations of parental rights within the Native 
American community in the mid-twentieth century. It suggests that a federal statute 
modeled on the Indian Child Welfare Act may be able to comprehensively address 
the issues identified herein. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
irila Baltazar Cruz, a Mexican woman of Chatino descent, gave 
birth to a baby girl in a Pascagoula, Mississippi hospital in 2008.1 
Ms. Balthazar Cruz, who speaks limited Spanish and very little 
English, was questioned about her living situation by a representative 
of the hospital’s social services department and a Spanish-speaking 
“patient advocate.” 2  The hospital concluded erroneously that Ms. 
Baltazar Cruz was trading sex for housing, filed a report with the 
Mississippi Department of Human Services (MDHS) against Ms. 
Baltazar Cruz alleging parental abuse and neglect, and contacted 
federal immigration authorities to investigate Ms. Baltazar Cruz’s 
immigration status.3 MDHS obtained a custody order for her baby, 
placed the baby placed in foster care with an unlicensed white couple,4 
and began the process of initiating termination of parental rights (TPR) 
proceedings against Ms. Baltazar Cruz. 5  MDHS did not provide 
Chatino interpretation for Ms. Baltazar Cruz while investigating the 
claims against her, and instead requested the mother learn English in 
order to be reunited with her daughter.6 Ms. Baltazar Cruz did not 
regain physical custody of her child until November 2009, one year 
after giving birth;7 she did not recover permanent physical custody 
until early 2010.8 
While Ms. Baltazar Cruz’s parental rights were not ultimately 
terminated and she regained custody of her child, her case is a 
particularly dramatic example of the trials many immigrant parents in 
the United States face in maintaining custody of their children. Data 
suggests the U.S. government removed 9  approximately 46,000 
                                                 
1 Complaint at 5–6, Cirila Baltazar Cruz v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Serv., No. 
3:10cv446HTN-LRA (S.D. Miss. 2010). Chatinos are an indigenous community 
in Mexico. Id. at 5. 
2 Id. at 6, 10. 
3 Id. at 7–10. 
4 Id. at 6, 10. 
5 Id. at 20. 
6 Id. at 19–20. 
7 Id. at 21. 
8 Id. 
9 See Diana R. Podgorny, Comment, Rethinking the Increased Focus on Penal 
Measures in Immigration Law as Reflected in the Expansion of the “Aggravated 
Felony” Concept, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 287, 295 (2009) (noting that, 
in 1996, “removal” replaced “deportation” in immigration law parlance.”). 
C 
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immigrant parents of U.S. citizen children in the first six months of 
2011 alone and there are currently at least 5,100 children in foster care 
whose parents have either been detained or removed.10 The numbers 
represent a dramatic increase in rates of removal: the U.S. government 
reported removing 108,000 parents of U.S. citizen children between 
1998 and 2007.11 
Despite these statistics, it is difficult to determine exactly how 
many immigrant parents have had their parental rights terminated for 
reasons related to their status as immigrants. Immigrant parents rarely 
appeal family court decisions for financial and logistical reasons, 
especially if the parents are deported and living in a foreign country 
from which it is difficult to contest a termination of parental rights 
(TPR) decision in a U.S. court.12 Further, since many child custody 
case records are sealed, it is impossible to estimate the rate of parental 
rights terminations with a high degree of certainty.13 However, in spite 
of these difficulties, a few courts have recently considered a few such 
termination appeals, giving scholars a glimpse into the legal standards 
used to terminate immigrants’ parental rights. 14  Further, recent 
                                                 
10 APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, SHATTERED FAMILIES: THE PERILOUS 
INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE 
SYSTEM 5−6 (2011), available at http://arc.org/shatteredfamilies. This data was 
collected despite the fact that the U.S. government does not keep records on 
whether deported parents leave the country with their children or if the state 
transfers their children to foster care even though most children of immigrants 
are U.S. citizens. See Francisco Miraval, Thousands of Children of Deported 
Parents Get Stuck in Foster Care, THE DENVER POST, Nov. 17, 2011. See 
generally Jacqueline Hagan et al., The Effects of U.S. Deportation Policies on 
Immigrant Families and Communities: Cross-Border Perspectives, 88 N.C. L. 
REV. 1799, 1809 (2010) (the statistics bely the U.S. government’s contention 
that it mainly targets immigrants who have committed serious violent crimes). 
11 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
REMOVALS INVOLVING ILLEGAL ALIEN PARENTS OF UNITED STATES CITIZEN 
CHILDREN 4 (2009), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-
15_Jan09.pdf. 
12 C. Elizabeth Hall, Comment, Where are My Children . . . And My Rights? 
Parental Rights Termination as a Consequence of Deportation, 60 DUKE L.J. 
1459, 1462 (2011). 
13 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2600 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 625.108(2) (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:14 (2011) (state 
statutes that require all court records pertaining to the termination of parental 
rights to be kept confidential). 
14 See In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 815 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) 
(reversing the lower court’s termination of an undocumented immigrant 
mother’s parental rights after she was picked up in an immigration raid and held 
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scholarship has compiled anecdotal data suggesting that substantial 
numbers of immigrant parents are struggling to maintain their parental 
rights.15 Even if courts ultimately restore custody to the parent upon a 
child’s removal from the parent’s custody, as was the case for Ms. 
Baltazar Cruz, the months of separation, fear, and insecurity felt by 
both parents and children as a function of our nation’s flawed 
immigration and family law coordination system is itself a problem 
that deserves correction.16 
For parents who are undocumented, not fluent in English, poor, 
and embrace parenting traditions considered uncommon by American 
standards, threats to parental rights are especially acute. In dealing 
with these threats, such parents face cultural prejudice, language 
barriers, and lack of financial access to an attorney.17 Moreover, if they 
are simultaneously detained by immigration officials, they also face 
difficulty in adequately defending themselves while in immigration 
                                                                                                                   
in detention for many months); In re Interest of Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74, 
91–92 (Neb. 2009) (reversing the lower court’s termination of an undocumented 
immigrant mother’s parental rights after removal proceedings were initiated 
against her); Perez-Velazquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-
09-4, 2009 WL 1851017 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (upholding the lower court’s 
termination of parental rights of an undocumented immigrant who had been 
deported); State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-
R3-PT, 2005 WL 975339 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming the lower court’s 
decision not to terminate the parental rights of an undocumented father who had 
been deported). 
15 See, e.g., Nina Rabin, Disappearing Parents: Immigration Enforcement and the 
Child Welfare System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 99, 103 (2011) (concluding after 
helping an undocumented mother in Arizona reunify with her child and 
conducting surveys and interviews around the state that “her client’s case is not 
an anomaly”); Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination, 32 
B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 63, 82 (2012) (“In undocumented immigrant termination 
cases, courts and welfare agencies frequently conclude that a parent’s 
undocumented status alone demonstrates unfitness”); Hall, supra note 12 at 
1461–62 (“Despite the relatively small number of cases that have come before 
appellate courts and the relatively high percentage of those cases that have had 
parent-friendly outcomes, there is reason to suspect that parent-friendly 
outcomes are the exception, not the rule.”); see also A Family Ripped Apart: 
Mother of Four Fighting for Return of Children Put in Foster Care After Judge 
Ruled She Abandoned Them While Detained for Illegal Immigration, DAILY 
MAIL (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2095743/Amelia-
Reyes-Jimenez-Immigrant-mother-fighting-return-children-foster-care.html. 
16 Rabin, supra note 15, at 102; Hall, supra note 12, at 1462. 
17 Marcia Yablon-Zug, supra note 15, at 83. 
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detention or having been deported.18 Lack of coordination between 
state child protective services agencies and federal immigration 
enforcement officials compound the problems of immigrant parents 
ensnared in concurrent family law and immigration proceedings.19  
These problems recall the obstacles faced by Native American 
parents in maintaining custody over their children. Prior to the Indian 
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978, an alarming number of Native 
American children were separated from their parents, sent to foster 
homes, and put up for adoption in white, Christian families.20 This 
process was largely due to cultural prejudices against Native American 
family traditions and Native Americans’ difficulty in successfully 
navigating the American family court system. 21  Similarly, Ms. 
Baltazar Cruz was unable to rely on any special legal protections to 
assist her in navigating an unfamiliar legal system—that viewed her 
ethno-linguistic background and immigration status with suspicion—
and prevent her newborn baby from being placed with a white family 
against her express wishes. 
The striking parallels between the difficulties Native American 
families faced in the mid-twentieth century and what immigrant 
parents are facing today, discussed in the pages below, brings me to 
suggest that the ICWA can serve as a useful legislative model for 
advocates of immigrant family unity. As history repeats itself in 
making it difficult for marginalized communities to maintain family 
unity in the United States, we should learn from the past and enact 
protections similar to those in the ICWA for immigrant parents. 
Parts II and III of this Note dissect the question of why immigrant 
parents are threatened with losing their parental rights. Part II explores 
the relevant family law background, emphasizing recent developments 
that make it more likely for immigrant parents to face termination of 
their parental rights. Part III examines the relevant immigration law 
background, particularly recently passed legislation that threatens 
more immigrants with deportation. It analyzes the “coordination 
concerns” between the bodies of law, suggesting that lack of 
coordination between immigration enforcement officials and child 
                                                 
18 Hall, supra note 12, at 1462. 
19 See Rabin, supra note 15, at 102. 
20 See Catherine Brooks, The Indian Child Welfare Act in Nebraska: Fifteen Years, 
A Foundation for the Future, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 661, 662 (1994); Mary 
Charlotte McMullen, Preserving the Indian Family, 2 CHILD. LEGAL RTS J. 32, 
33 (1981). 
21 Id. 
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protective services officials is an important factor leading to immigrant 
parents unnecessarily facing termination of their parental rights. Part 
III suggests coordination issues between family and international law 
also place the United States in violation of customary international 
law. 
Part IV discusses the history of other minority families in this 
country, particularly Native American families, to suggest that the 
current problem may also be a function of historically-rooted cultural 
prejudice against non-white and non-traditional families in the United 
States. This Part goes on to discuss the federal response to the 
alarming rates of the termination of parental rights in Native 
Americans: the Indian Child Welfare Act. Lastly, this Note concludes 
with a proposal that the ICWA should serve as a model for a solution 
to alleviate the threats to immigrant family unity today. 
II. FAMILY LAW: INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL PRINCIPLES 
This Part briefly examines family law at the constitutional, state, 
and federal levels and how it relates to immigrant parents. Laws 
defining parental unfitness and grounds for the termination of parental 
rights vary from state to state. However, the federal Adoption and Safe 
Families Act (ASFA) virtually compels states to initiate TPR 
proceedings when a child has been separated from her parent for 15 of 
the preceding 22 months.22 Part II concludes that the ASFA trigger 
mechanism, combined with the propensity of some family courts to 1) 
consider immigration status in parental fitness determinations and 2) 
devalue non-Western parenting traditions, has led to unnecessary 
initiations of TPR proceedings and, in some cases, unnecessary 
terminations of parental rights. 
A. Federal Constitutional Protections Animating State Family 
Law 
The states have traditionally exercised discretion over matters of 
family law.23 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed federal 
constitutional safeguards to protect the due process rights of parents 
subject to termination of their parental rights. The Court has found that 
                                                 
22 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)–(F) (2006). 
23 Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593 (1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic 
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, 
and not to the laws of the United States.”). 
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a natural parent’s right to raise his child is a fundamental liberty 
interest. 24  And as the Court in Santosky v. Kramer noted, “The 
fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and 
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they 
have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their 
child to the State.”25 Terminating a parent’s parental rights “work[s] a 
unique kind of deprivation” that does not merely infringe on but rather 
extinguishes the liberty interest identified above.26 
Thus, states must provide a hearing for the parent27 and prove, by 
at least clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is unfit before 
terminating his or her parental rights.28 As the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies to undocumented as well as documented persons in the United 
States,29 by implication, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard 
applies to undocumented immigrant parents as well as documented 
ones.30 The Court has also found that the United States’ Constitution 
does not guarantee parents the appointment of counsel in TPR 
proceedings.31 However, the majority of states provide for that right.32 
                                                 
24 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“[F]reedom of personal choice 
in matters of family life is a fundamental interest protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 605, 651 (1972) (“The 
private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, 
undeniably warrants deference, and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, 
protection.”). 
25 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. 
26 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). 
27 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. 
28 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769–70. The “best interests of the child” standard that 
permeates the courts’ approach to family law issues involving children, cannot 
be considered until a parent has been held as unfit by the clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard. Id. at 760. 
29 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982) (holding that both the Due Process 
Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “were 
fashioned . . . to reach every exercise of state authority” and extend to those who 
entered the United States unlawfully). 
30 See, e.g., In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 815 (Mo. 2011) (en 
banc) (held, in a case involving an illegal immigrant parent, that the court must 
apply the clear and convincing standard in terminating parental rights); see also 
Hall, supra note 12, at 1465. 
31 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32. 
32 Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel for 
Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services of Durham, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 635, 638–39 (2006). 
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While states are not constitutionally required to provide an appeals 
process for termination decisions,33  indigent parents do have equal 
protection and due process rights to receive trial transcripts in order to 
prepare an appeal of a court’s termination decision if and when an 
appeal is available.34 
B. Family Law Procedures: Parental Fitness Determinations 
and Terminations of Parental Rights 
There is significant variation among each states’ procedures for 
initiating the termination of parental rights and their definitions of the 
grounds justifying TPR. 35  However, a general pattern may be 
identified. Once a child has been taken into temporary custody by the 
state or a foster family, child protective services agencies have an 
obligation to make “reasonable efforts” to implement a reunification 
plan between parent and child and assist the parent in complying with 
the plan before initiating TPR proceedings.36 Once the “reasonable 
efforts” test has been satisfied, courts often terminate parental rights 
on, among other grounds, the following bases: 1) abandonment, 2) 
abuse or neglect, 3) failure to support or maintain contact with the 
child, 4) failure to adhere to a reunification or rehabilitation plan, 5) 
failure to remedy a persistent condition that caused the removal of a 
child, 6) mental illness or deficiency, 7) drug- or alcohol-induced 
incapacity, or 8) the prior termination of parental rights in another 
child.37 
In several recent cases, state courts have considered a parent’s 
illegal entry into the United States and a parent’s immigrant detainee 
status as negative factors in determining parental fitness. 38  In re 
                                                 
33 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (“[A] State is not required by the 
Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at 
all.”). 
34 M.L.B v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996). 
35 S. Adam Ferguson, Comment, Not Without My Daughter: Deportation and the 
Termination of Parental Rights, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 85, 94 (2007). 
36 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006). 
37 Grounds for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERV. 2, available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide
/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.cfm; see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 170-C:5 (2011). 
38 See, e.g., In re B and J Minors, 279 Mich. App. 12 (2009) (reviewing a lower 
court’s holding that the deported parents in question “were . . . unable to provide 
proper care and custody for the children”); In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., No. SD 
30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d by 332 S.W.3d 793 
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Angelica L. is one such example. The juvenile court found the parent 
unfit and terminated her parental rights in part because she “either A) 
embarked on an unauthorized trip to the United States with a newborn 
premature infant or B) [after entering illegally,] gave birth to a 
premature infant in the United States.” 39  This is profoundly 
problematic because a parent’s immigration status has virtually no 
bearing on her intrinsic ability to provide the minimum of care for her 
child that is considered adequate for parental fitness.40 This trend of 
family courts conflating parental fitness with immigration status is 
jeopardizing the parental rights of immigrant parents41 and courts must 
immediately correct this erroneous interpretation of fitness. 
Finally, child protective agency determinations to seek the 
termination of immigrant parental rights and state court decisions on 
the issue may be influenced by cultural bias against some immigrant 
parents. Marcia Yablon-Zug and others have highlighted the 
contention that the fitness of undocumented parents is easily called 
into question.42 They have found that when an immigrant parent is to 
be deported, courts and child protective agency officials may: 1) shy 
away from sending U.S. citizen children to live with their deported 
parents in foreign countries where economic opportunities are lacking 
and the children may not be familiar with the language or customs; 2) 
consider life in the United States to be more desirable and in the 
children’s best interests; and 3) favorably consider the situation in 
which an American family, usually in current custody of the child, 
petitions to adopt the child.43 
Officials may also assume undocumented immigrant parents are 
unable to financially provide for their children, especially if they 
cannot verify that the parents are legally employed.44 Since employers 
are legally prohibited from hiring undocumented workers, proving a 
source of legal income is difficult for many undocumented parents.45 
                                                                                                                   
(Mo. 2011) (finding that the parent’s “lifestyle, that of smuggling herself into a 
country illegally . . . is not a lifestyle . . . for a child.”). 
39 In re Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d 74, 87–88 (Neb. 2009) (quoting the juvenile 
court decision, which it reversed). 
40 See Yablon-Zug, supra note 15, at 87. 
41 Hall, supra note 12, at 1484–85. 
42 Yablon-Zug, supra note 15, at 65. 
43 Hall, supra note 12, at 1481–82. 
44 APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 10, at 20. 
45 Id. 
572 UMass Law Review v. 8 | 562 
Additionally, child protective agency officials may be more willing to 
recommend that a court remove a child from his or her parent’s 
custody or terminate parental rights because, as in the case of Ms. 
Baltazar Cruz, they view some immigrant parenting traditions such as 
breastfeeding, co-sleeping, or shared parenting by an extended family 
as undesirable by traditional Western standards. 46  These biases 
disadvantage immigrant parents in the struggle to maintain their 
parental rights.47 
C. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) and 
the Termination “Trigger” 
Congress has also occasionally regulated child custody matters 
despite state law typically governing family law. For example, the 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 conditioned state 
receipt of federal funds on states making “reasonable efforts” to 
reunify children with their parents before placing the children in foster 
care.48 Congress’ most relevant contribution to this body of law is the 
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”).49 Here, Congress 
attempted to achieve permanence for children in the foster care 
system 50  by requiring states that receive federal funds for child 
protective services to commence procedures to begin TPR proceedings 
for children who have lived in foster care for fifteen of the preceding 
twenty-two months.51 
Under ASFA, twelve months after a child has entered foster care, 
the state must schedule a “permanency hearing” to determine whether 
the child should be: “(1) returned to the parent; (2) placed for 
adoption, in which case the state will petition to terminate parental 
rights; (3) referred for legal guardianship; or (4) placed in another 
planned living arrangement.” 52  A state court may accept a child 
protective agency’s conclusion that reunification between the child and 
                                                 
46 See Complaint supra note 1, at 19–20; see also Annette R. Appell, Bad Mothers 
and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers, 7 NEV. L.J. 759, 776–77 (2007). 
47 Yablon-Zug, supra note 15, at 113–14 (“Courts and child welfare agencies 
routinely express concerns regarding the language, values and lifestyle of 
undocumented immigrants in immigrant parent termination cases.”). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2006). 
49 Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–679c (1997). 
50 Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the 
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2001). 
51 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E)–(F) (2006). 
52 Adler, supra note 50, at 8. 
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his parent is unreasonable as sufficient grounds for terminating 
parental rights.53 
While the ASFA does not consider a parent unfit by virtue of his 
child living in foster care for twelve of the preceding twenty-two 
months period, some state courts have attached a presumption of 
unfitness to that arrangement.54 Further, it is too easy for immigrant 
detainee parents, who are often bounced around our nation’s 
patchwork of immigration detention facilities for many months and 
then scheduled for deportation, to meet the twelve-month or fifteen-
month mark of being separated from their children. Agency officials 
may determine that reunification is unreasonable, especially if the 
parent has been deported. Or, a state court may determine the child as 
abandoned, and parental rights terminations may sometimes proceed 
over the parent’s objections without a proper fitness determination.55 
III. IMMIGRATION POLICY, NON-COORDINATION WITH 
FAMILY LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS 
As state and federal family law facilitates the initiation of TPR 
proceedings against immigrant detainee parents, recent federal 
immigration legislation has increased the likelihood that parents may 
be placed in immigration detention in the first place. This Part 
describes the basic immigration policy framework and recent 
legislation that expands the categories of immigrants subject to 
detention and deportation. It notes that while the Obama 
administration has increased prosecutorial discretion of immigration 
enforcement officials to limit deportations of otherwise law-abiding 
immigrants, subsequent administrations may not be as flexible. 
Further, this Part concludes that the recent anti-immigrant 
development in immigration law has exacerbated coordination 
problems between immigration and family law and has increased the 
number of immigrant parents simultaneously seeking to avoid losing 
their children and being removed from this country. Finally, this Part 
observes that our nation’s failure to take steps to prevent unnecessary 
breakups of immigrant parents seems to violate customary 
international law on family unity and the rights of the child. 
                                                 
53 Id. at 7. 
54 Hall, supra note 12, at 1469–70. 
55 Id. at 1472. 
574 UMass Law Review v. 8 | 562 
A. Immigration Policy Background 
In contrast to family law, immigration law has generally been 
under exclusive federal control.56 The elected branches of our federal 
government set our nation’s immigration policy, and shifting 
American sentiments over immigration have periodically led to both 
stricter and more relaxed immigration laws. The Court has recognized 
“plenary power” in the executive and legislative branches of the 
federal government to set immigration policy, with minimal judicial 
review.57 The seminal piece of federal immigration legislation is the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which Congress has 
periodically amended in the decades since its enactment.58 Presidential 
administrations also affect immigration policy. For example, the 
president may direct administrative officials to use their discretion in 
enforcing removal laws or allowing for cancellation of deportation in 
given situations.59 
Moreover, the American citizenry’s alternately friendly and hostile 
sentiments towards immigrants have also shaped our nation’s 
immigration policies.60  The turn of the 20th century was an era in 
which the United States had a fairly exclusionary immigration policy, 
while the 1960s through the 1990s marked a more inclusionary time.61 
                                                 
56 E.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (“The power of 
exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the 
government of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated 
by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of 
the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or 
restrained on behalf of any one.”). But see Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration 
Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1749, 
1751,1754 (2011) (examining the “expanding landscape of immigration 
enforcement” at the state and local level “under the auspices of regulating 
crime”). 
57 See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 341, 347 (2008). 
58 Hagan et al., supra note 10, at 1803 (“[T]he Immigration and Nationality 
Act . . . remains the statutory framework for federal immigration law.”). 
59 Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 611 
(2006) (“The executive enjoys its customary authority not to pursue 
enforcement, and Congress has authorized the executive to formally exempt 
deportable aliens from removal for sympathetic or compelling reasons.”). 
60 Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 2 (1984). 
61 Hagan et al., supra note 10, at 1802–03. 
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B. Recent Legislation: Immigrants at Increasing Risk of 
Detention and Removal 
In 1996, the pendulum swung again. Congress passed two laws 
making it easier to detain non-citizens: the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”).62 The AEDPA 
scaled back the discretionary authority of administrative officials to 
cancel removal for certain classes of immigrants by changing the 
standard of discretion from “exceptional” hardship to the immigrant 
and his family to “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”63 The 
AEDPA also limited judicial review of removal decisions.64 
Meanwhile, the IIRIRA expanded the aggravated felony definition 
to include all convictions that resulted in a prison sentence of one year 
or more.65 Given that immigrants who have committed an aggravated 
felony are not eligible for cancellation of removal, 66  the IIRIRA 
further reduced administrative discretion to cancel removal and 
expanded the universe of immigrants who cannot successfully appeal 
their removal to include those convicted for crimes classified under the 
criminal justice system as misdemeanors.67 
Thus, the AEDPA and the IIRIRA increased the likelihood that 
U.S. citizen children would be separated from their immigrant parents 
by increasing the likelihood that immigrant parents would be removed. 
An immigrant parent who has been detained and who has been 
convicted of an act for which he was sentenced to a year or more in 
                                                 
62 Lee Gelernt, The 1996 Immigration Legislation and the Assault on the Courts, 
67 BROOK. L. REV. 455, 455 (2001). 
63 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006); see also Hagan et. al., supra note 10, at 
1804–05; Podgorny, supra note 9, at 295 (noting that the AEDPA also changed 
the language of turning out immigrants from our borders from “deportation” or 
“exclusion” to “removal”). 
64 ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 222 (2010). 
65 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, § 671, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-720–22 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006)); see also Hagan et. al., 
supra note 10, at 1804. 
66 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006). 
67 Podgorny, supra note 9, at 296. “The definition of aggravated felony for the 
purpose of removing individuals from the United States has been expanded so 
that now an aggravated felony need no longer be either aggravated or a felony.” 
Id. at 289. 
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prison is no longer eligible for cancellation of removal. 68  Further, 
because family separation is not viewed as “extraordinary and 
extremely unusual,” 69  the AEDPA’s stricter standard of discretion 
means that immigrant parents are foreclosed from arguing that being 
separated from their U.S. citizen children is a hardship that merits 
cancellation of removal. The sole remaining argument immigrant 
parents may advance to seek cancellation due to family hardship is to 
claim that if their children depart the country with them, they will face 
extraordinary and extremely unusual hardship in the country to which 
they depart.70 
Moreover, following the September 11th terrorist attacks, Congress 
passed the PATRIOT Act. 71 This Act further increased the likelihood 
that immigrants would be detained and separated from their families 
for months at a time as it “further expanded the categories of 
immigrants eligible for deportation . . . who are perceived as threats to 
national security or seen as opposing U.S. foreign policy.”72 
As a result of the AEDPA, IIRIRA, and the PATRIOT Act, the 
number of immigrants in immigration detention has dramatically risen 
in the last ten years.73 For example, the number of immigrant detainees 
doubled between 2003 and 2008.74 In the fiscal year 2010, the U.S. 
government detained approximately 363,000 immigrants.75 
                                                 
68 See supra note 65. 
69 David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child 
Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1171 (2006) (“[S]eparation from family 
members is “simply one of the ‘common results of deportation or exclusion 
[that] are insufficient to prove extreme hardship.’” (quoting Jimenez v. Immig. 
Naturalization Serv., No. 96-70169 (9th Cir. 1997))). 
70 Id. 
71 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56 § 412(a), 115 Stat. 
272, 351 (2001). 
72 Hagan et al., supra note 10, at 1804. See also Michael T. McCarthy, USA 
Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 449 (2002) (“The effect of the USA 
Patriot Act . . . is to allow the Attorney General to detain indefinitely not only 
those convicted of crimes or immigration offenses, as under old law, but also 
any person the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe is a terrorist 
or ‘is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the 
United States.’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(3)(B) (2001))). 
73 See infra footnotes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
74 Nina Bernstein, Immigration Detention System Lapses Detailed, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/us/03immig.html. 
75 APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 10, at 7. 
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C. The Obama Administration’s Prosecutorial Approach 
The Obama administration has taken a somewhat more tolerant 
approach to immigration policy. While legislation like the proposed 
Dream Act has failed in Congress,76 the administration has relied on its 
prosecutorial discretion to craft a new policy in mid-2011 that targets 
its immigration enforcement resources at national security risks, 
serious felons, known gang members, and those who have repeatedly 
flouted the nation’s immigration laws.77 Last spring, the administration 
also created an administrative workaround to functionally implement 
many of the Dream Act’s provisions.78 Finally, President Obama has 
made comprehensive immigration reform a legislative priority of his 
second term in office.79 At the same time, the immigration officials are 
deemphasizing enforcement against undocumented immigrants who do 
not pose a threat to public safety and explicitly consider an 
immigrant’s family ties in the country and whether he or she has U.S. 
citizen children as weighing against enforcement.80 The administration 
is also focusing on sanctioning employers of illegal immigrant labor as 
opposed to raiding workplaces to punish the immigrants who are hired 
to perform the labor 81  and centralizing our nation’s immigration 
detention system.82 
                                                 
76 David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Blocks Bill for Young Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics
/19immig.html. 
77 Memorandum from John Morton, Director, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 5 (June 17, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-
memo.pdf. 
78 Julia Preston and John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to 
Remain in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012
/06/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting-some-illegal-
immigrants.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
79 Jennifer Epstein, Obama Renews Push on Immigration Reform, POLITICO (Mar. 
27, 2013), http://www.politico.com/politico44/2013/03/obama-renews-push-on-
immigration-reform-160372.html. 
80 See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 77, at 4; see also Charlie 
Savage, 2901 Arrested in Crackdown on Criminal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/us/crackdown-on-
criminal-immigrants-operation-cross-check-brings-2901-arrests.html. 
81 Julia Preston, U.S. Shifts Strategy on Illicit Work by Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES( 
Jul. 3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/us/03immig.html. 
82 Nina Bernstein, U.S. to Reform Policy on Detention for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/us/politics/06detain.html. 
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Advocates for immigrants are optimistic that, in the short run, 
these policy changes may help preserve immigrant family unity by 
decreasing the number of immigrant parents targeted for removal.83 
However, it is too soon to fully evaluate the effect of these 
administrative policies on immigrant parents.84 Further, these policies 
are subject to change upon the election of a new administration, 
emphasizing the need for statutory, not administrative, remedies to 
protect immigrant parents. 
D. Lack of Coordination between Family and Immigration 
Law 
As this review of family law and immigration law principles 
suggests, a tension exists between the at-times contradictory goals of 
our nation’s immigration and family law systems. This is both 
unfortunate and ironic considering that, in the words of one 
commentator, “[f]amily unity is a foundation of contemporary United 
States immigration law and policy.” 85  Further, when an immigrant 
parent must simultaneously navigate both our immigration and family 
law systems, usually as an immigrant detainee at risk of losing his 
parental rights, unintentional coordination failures between the two 
systems of law creates setbacks that further jeopardize an immigrant’s 
parental rights. 
Three primary coordination concerns can be identified. First, as 
mentioned above, the ASFA trigger mechanism for a state initiating 
TPR proceedings against a parent can be pulled by immigration 
officials placing a parent in immigration detention, thereby separating 
him from his child for what can end up being months or even years.86 
Second, practical problems with communication and legal 
representation arise when an immigrant parent is held in immigration 
detention while an involuntary child custody proceeding is initiated 
against him. 87  For example, 1.4 million detainees were transferred 
                                                 
83 Julia Preston, In Test of Deportation Policy, 1 in 6 Get a Fresh Look and a 
Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/us
/in-test-of-deportation-policy-1-in-6-offered-reprieve.html. 
84 Preliminary data, however, do reveal that immigrant parents are benefiting from 
this administrative policy shift. See id. 
85 Maria Pabón López, A Tale of Two Systems: Analyzing the Treatment of 
Noncitizen Families in State Family Law Systems and Under the Immigration 
Law System, 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 229, 229 (2008). 
86 See supra notes 52–53. 
87 See Hall, supra note 12, at 1472. 
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between 1999 and 2008, often to locations hundreds of miles away 
from their homes and families in the United States.88 Consequently, a 
parent may easily be shifted across the country from one detention 
facility to another with little or no warning.89 His ability to receive 
notice of this move and defend himself in the proceedings is also 
diminished, especially if he lacks representation.90 Third, the court is 
likely to consider the parent’s restricted movement and inability to 
contact his or her child during the time in detention as a negative 
factor in the court’s parental fitness determination—construing the 
parent’s failure to communicate as constituting abandonment or 
neglect.91 
Even when immigrant parents face deportation without the threat 
of TPR proceedings, such parents must still make the wrenching 
decision of whether to uproot their children from the United States and 
bring them to the often unfamiliar and economically underdeveloped 
nations of their origin or leave their children with family members or 
friends to grow up without them.92 The failure of coordination between 
federal immigration and state child protective agencies, however, 
means that state courts sometimes strip that decision making authority 
from the parents, a troubling development in the intersection between 
family and immigration law.93 
E. Coordination Failures as Flouting Customary International 
Norms Regarding Family Unity 
In addition to the problematic domestic implications of separating 
children from their parents, these separations also arguably violate 
customary international law.94 Unnecessarily removing children from 
                                                 
88 Bernstein, supra note 74. 
89 See Rabin, supra note 15, at 119–21 (describing the difficulties child protective 
agencies, courts, and attorneys had in tracking down and communicating with 
immigrant detainees). 
90 Id. 
91 See Hall, supra note 12, at 1472. 
92 See Erica Stief, Comment, Impractical Relief and the Innocent Victims: How 
United States Immigration Law Ignores the Rights of Citizen Children, 79 
UMKC L. REV. 477, 478 (2011) (quoting a father whose immigrant wife was 
recently removed as explaining, “It’s unbelievable if you think about our little 
boy, what his choices are . . . to be able to be in a good environment in his 
country or to be able to hug his mom.”). 
93 Rabin, supra note 15, at 102. 
94 Stief, supra note 92, at 492 (“[I]nternational customary law . . . does not permit 
the unnecessary separation of families.”). But see Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, 
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the custody of immigrant parents or terminating parental rights would 
seem to violate international norms that elevate family unity to a 
human right.95 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
codifies the right of a child to live with her natural parents, affirms the 
international community’s commitment to family unity 96  in 
conjunction with other conventions and international principles such as 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.97 
As a concept ripens into customary international law when it has 
been widely practiced by the international community,98 the various 
treaties and practices of other nations seem to have, at the very least, 
created an international norm supporting family unity.99 As a member 
and purported leader of the international community, the United States 
                                                                                                                   
Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. IT’L L. 
213, 230 (2003) (“It is probably too early to argue that a general norm against 
family separation has achieved the status of customary international law.”). 
95 A related problem is the failure of U.S. immigration law to consider the “best 
interests of the child” when a child is affected by an immigration proceeding. A 
parent who is scheduled for removal may be forced to leave his child behind in 
the United States. Absent proving “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship,” he will be unable to cancel removal to be with his child. Bridgette A. 
Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the Child” Approach into Immigration 
Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120, 123 (2009) (“Under 
current United States immigration law, accompanied children who are directly 
affected by immigration proceedings have no opportunity for their best interests 
to be considered.”); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text. However, 
addressing this important problem is beyond the scope of this Note. 
96 The treaty was subsequently ratified by all United Nations member nations with 
the exception of the United States and Somalia. Stief, supra note 92, at 477. The 
United States frequently refuses to ratify international agreements, including 
human rights treaties, because of concerns about maintaining sovereignty. 
Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the Children?: A Call for United 
States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 166–67 (2006). 
97 Anna-Liisa Jacobson, Dividing Lives: How Deporting Legal and Illegal 
Immigrants with United States-born Children is Separating Families and Why 
United States and International Laws are Failing Families, 12 RICH. J.L. & PUB. 
INT. 191, 208–11 (2011). 
98 See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900) (declaring that the 
world creates custom”[b]y an ancient usage among civilized 
nations . . . gradually ripening into a rule of international law . . . .”). 
99 Starr and Brilmayer, supra note 94, at 230. 
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has a moral and legal obligation to conform to customary international 
norms. However, allowing U.S. family law and immigration law to 
result in unnecessary separations of immigrant parents and their 
children and terminations of immigrant parental rights appears to fly in 
the face of this norm. While enforcement of this norm against the 
United States by the international community or by U.S. citizen 
children seems unlikely, there have been instances in which 
international courts have found claims against the United States 
alleging violations of international human rights laws to be 
justiciable.100 
IV. HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF: FINDING ECHOES OF THE 
CURRENT SITUTATION IN THE PLIGHTS OF NATIVE 
AMERICAN FAMILIES 
The situation facing immigrant parents and their U.S. citizen 
children is analogous to the problems faced by Native American—and 
to a lesser extent, Irish and African-American—parents and children in 
decades past. In all three instances, bias against the mentioned 
minorities, borne of cultural differences and socioeconomic 
stratification, was built into the U.S. child welfare system, resulting in 
disproportionately high levels of separation between parents and 
children for the groups in question.101 Part IV examines how and why 
Native American families faced disproportionately high levels of 
separation and terminations of parental rights, parallels to the situation 
facing immigrant families today, and the genesis of the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, setting up this Note’s conclusion that a similar legislative 
act on behalf of immigrant parents may solve many of the current-day 
threats to immigrant family unity. 
                                                 
100 See Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, Jessica Gonzales v. United States: An Emerging 
Model for Domestic Violence & Human Rights Advocacy in the United States, 
21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 184 (2008) (tracing the 2007 decision by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights that declared the organization had 
judicial competence to examine the human rights claims of a U.S. citizen and 
domestic violence victim who had unsuccessfully sought redress in the U.S. 
courts). 
101 Yablon-Zug, supra note 15, at 109 (“The current removals of minority 
immigrant children from their homes may be a repetition of . . . history.”). 
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A. Challenges to Family Unity for Native Americans and 
Parallels to Challenges Facing Immigrant Parents Today 
This Note primarily focuses on the parallels between Native 
American and immigrant families because they are the most apt. 
However, it is important to note that in the nineteenth century, before 
the rise of the nation’s child welfare system, hundreds of thousands of 
Irish and free African-American children were separated from their 
families and sent to work and to be adopted out West. 102  One 
commentator describes this movement as an attempt by overzealous 
social reformers to instill “[w]hite, middle-class values and work 
ethic” in immigrant and black children.103 
Our nation’s long history of institutional disrespect for Native 
American autonomy extended to the Native American family unit. 
Native American children were often permanently separated from their 
parents throughout the 1800s. Social reformers, known as the Friends 
of the Indian, pushed for Native American children to be educated in 
federal boarding schools and assimilate to the ways of white Christian 
Americans.104 In the twentieth century, separations continued to occur, 
this time within the developing governmental child welfare system. 
Child protective officials often perceived Native American parents as 
unfit and placed the children in foster care or up for adoption. 105 
Consequently, an estimated 25% of Native American children were 
separated from their parents during the 1960s and 1970s.106 
                                                 
102 Appell, supra note 46, at 763–64 (explaining the efforts of the “child saver” 
reform movement to send poor Catholic and free African-American children 
separated from their parents and who were often not orphans on “orphan trains 
bound for adoption and work.”). 
103 Appell, supra note 46, at 763–64. 
104 Linda Lacey, The White Man’s Law and the American Indian Family in the 
Assimilation Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 327, 356 & 359 (1986–1987). 
105 Id., at 375–76. Research shows that child protective officials removed the vast 
majority of Native American children for reasons that did not include physical 
abuse. Indian Child Welfare Program: Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, 
of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 4 (1974) (statement of 
William Byler, Exec. Dir., Ass’n on Am. Indian Affairs). Rather, officials based 
their removal decisions on factors such as deprivation, neglect, and poverty, 
often making (negative) normative assumptions about the Native American way 
of life. Id. 
106 Indian Child Welfare Program: Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, of the 
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 3 (1974) (statement of 
William Byler, Exec. Dir., Ass’n on Am. Indian Affairs). 
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There are multiple similarities between the challenges faced by 
twentieth-century Native American parents and those confronting 
immigrant parents of today. For one, similar to how immigrant parents 
in detention can fail to learn or understand of custody or TPR 
proceedings initiated against them, Native American parents would 
often unknowingly relinquish their parental rights when social services 
agencies provided them with parental rights waivers in conjunction 
with welfare receipt forms.107 Second, just as child protective services 
officials view some immigrant parenting traditions with suspicion, 
child protective services officials perceived Native American 
traditions such as communal parenting as a form of neglect or 
abandonment.108 Third, both groups frequently lacked access to the 
family courts, preventing parents from appealing terminations 
decisions.109 
Fourth, courts and child services officials used parental alcoholism 
as a reason for terminating parental rights much the same way they use 
a parent’s immigration status today.110 One commentator notes: 
Because of the pervasiveness of addiction diseases in native 
peoples, members of Congress and those who testified on behalf of 
ICWA’s passage were concerned that the occurrence of alcoholism in 
American Indian families was being used by non-Indian social work 
professionals to intervene and remove children . . . without proper 
inquiry into the child’s circumstances in the larger or extended 
family.111 
Finally, it is interesting to note that many of the immigrant parents 
who have the greatest difficulty in communicating with child 
                                                 
107 See supra note 87 and accompanying text; Preserving the Indian Family, 2 
CHILD. LEGAL RTS J. 32, 33 (1981). Native American parents would often 
unknowingly relinquish their parental rights when social services agencies 
provided them with parental rights waivers in conjunction with welfare receipt 
forms. Id. 
108 Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward 
a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 603 
(2002). 
109 See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also Jose Monsivais, A Glimmer 
of Hope: A Proposal to Keep the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 Intact, 22 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1997). 
110 See Brooks, supra note 20, at 686. 
111 Id. To affirm this point, data suggests that in non-Native American communities 
that had comparable rates of alcoholism, adjudications of parental neglect were 
much lower. Preserving the Indian Family, 2 CHILD. LEGAL RTS J. 32, 33 
(1981). 
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protective services officials are indigenous Mexican, Central, and 
South American immigrants who, like Ms. Baltazar Cruz, do not speak 
fluent Spanish.112 These indigenous immigrants are underserved by 
child protective services agencies unused to interacting with non-
Spanish or Portuguese-speaking Latin American immigrants.113 
There are also, of course, differences between the two situations. 
Unlike immigrant families, Native American communities also feared 
extinction if their children continued to be taken into the foster care 
system and adopted by non-Native American families at such high 
rates. Further, Native Americans were concerned about maintaining 
tribal sovereignty in the face of U.S. government interference in their 
family structures.114 The similarities, however, allow us to examine 
how the federal government tried to solve the issues affecting Native 
American parents once it became aware of the extent of the problem. 
B.  The Indian Child Welfare Act 
Congress responded to the crisis by enacting the Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978. 115  The ICWA strengthened the procedural 
safeguards against the unnecessary termination of Native American 
parental rights. For one, the ICWA grants Native American tribes 
jurisdiction in child custody proceedings involving an “Indian child 
who resides or is domiciled” in an Indian reservation and allows 
Native American parents, custodians, or tribes to request transfer of 
venue to tribal jurisdiction in a state court custody proceeding if an 
Indian child is not subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction.116 
The statute also contains special notice requirements when Indian 
children are involved in an involuntary child custody proceedings, 
provides for right to counsel for Native American parents in a child 
                                                 
112 See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text; Aaron Nelsen, Torn Apart: How 
the Government Separates Parents and Children, IN THESE TIMES (Dec. 20, 
2011), http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/torn_apart_how_the_federal_govern
ment_separates_parents_and_children/. 
113 See Claudia Torrens, Some N.Y. Immigrants Cite Lack of Spanish as a Barrier, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 28, 2011), available at http://cnsnews.com/news
/articles/some-ny-immigrants-cite-lack-spanish-barrier. 
114 Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, 
Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 600 
(1993–1994). 
115 Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2006). 
116 Michael C. Snyder, An Overview of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 7 ST. THOMAS 
L. REV. 815, 826–27 (1995). 
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custody proceeding, heightens the standard of proof required for 
termination of parental rights to “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and 
requires child protective officials exert “active efforts” to provide 
remedial and rehabilitative programming to Native American families 
before initiating the foster care placement process.117 
Further, the ICWA creates a placement preference system for 
Native American parents to voluntarily consent for their children to be 
adopted or placed into foster care by family members, other Native 
American families from their communities, or families licensed to care 
for Indian children “absent good cause to the contrary.”118 Finally, the 
ICWA provides a process for parents to recover their parental rights 
(or tribes to recover their children) if a court fails to follow ICWA 
requirements119 as a way for parents to petition to recover custody of 
their children even after they have voluntarily consented for their child 
to be adopted.120 
While some have questioned the effectiveness of the ICWA in the 
decades after its passage, 121  the Act has undoubtedly reduced the 
amount of abuse in the child welfare system as it pertains to Native 
American families.122 Indeed, Native American parents are still using 
                                                 
117 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (2006); see also Snyder, supra note 116, at 831–32. 
118 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (2006). 
119 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (2006) (“Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for 
foster care placement or termination of parental rights under State law, any 
parent or Indian custodian from whose custody such child was removed, and the 
Indian child’s tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to 
invalidate such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of 
sections 1911, 1912, and 1913 of this title.”). 
120 25 U.S.C. § 1913(b-d) (2006). 
121 Sloan Philips, The Indian Child Welfare Act in the Face of Extinction, 21 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 351, 355 (1997) (“For many, the purposes of the ICWA have not 
been realized; Indian children are not being protected.”); Atwood, supra note 
108, at 588 (“By some accounts the Act has been the victim of entrenched state 
court hostility ever since its enactment . . . .); see also Lara Sullivan and Amy 
Walters, Incentives and Cultural Bias Fuel Foster System, NPR (Oct. 25, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141662357/incentives-and-cultural-bias-fuel-
foster-system (examining the disproportionately high number of Native 
American children being placed into state foster care systems today in spite of 
the Indian Child Welfare Act). 
122 Atwood, supra note 108, at 621 (2002) (“The ICWA has achieved considerable 
success in stemming unwarranted removals by state officials of Indian children 
from their families and communities.”). 
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the statute to enforce their rights in court today.123 Admittedly, some 
of the reasons for the ICWA, including the potential extinction of 
several Native American communities if removal and assimilation of 
Native American children continued at pre-1978 rates, do not exist 
here.124 However, both Native American and immigrant parents have 
faced and continue to face a child welfare system that undervalues 
their ability to parent due in part to cultural bias and a system which 
too often terminates their parental rights.125 As a result, enacting a 
statute modeled on the Indian Child Welfare Act on behalf of 
immigrant parents and their U.S. citizen children may help protect the 
rights of the families to avoid being unnecessarily divided under the 
auspices of American family law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Returning to Cirila Baltazar Cruz’s story, if legislation akin to the 
Indian Child Welfare Act had been in place when Ms. Baltazar Cruz 
had her baby taken from her, Ms. Baltazar Cruz would have had far 
more resources at her disposal in order to reunify with her child. For 
example, if she had been appointed assistance of counsel, an attorney 
would have been able to help her regain custody more quickly. If the 
Mississippi Department of Health Services had been required to make 
“active efforts” to provide remedial and rehabilitative resources to Ms. 
Baltazar Cruz before initiating TPR proceedings, MDHS would have 
likely never pursued TPR proceedings at all. If MDHS had pursued 
TPR but a heightened burden of proof had been in place, Ms. Baltazar 
Cruz would have never seriously feared losing her parental rights 
given the scarcity of evidence against her. 
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Of course, child protective services agencies and family courts will 
need to undertake additional, more specific steps to prevent stories like 
those of Ms. Baltazar Cruz from happening in the future. For example, 
child protective services agencies should exhibit greater cultural 
sensitivity to different parenting traditions and provide language 
access for parents they are investigating. Further, state courts should 
take care to separate a parent’s immigration status from their fitness as 
a parent. Perhaps additional federal legislation on these issues is 
necessary as well, given their import. However, the Indian Child 
Welfare Act can serve as a starting point for addressing the threats to 
parental rights facing immigrants in our country. History repeated 
itself in how we are treating immigrant families today; perhaps we can 
repeat history in a positive way by enacting an ICWA equivalent to 
correct our mistakes. 
